Exploring market properties of policy-based reserve procurement for power systems
Abstract
This paper proposes a market mechanism for co-optimization of energy and reserve procurement in dayahead electricity markets with high shares of renewable energy. The single-stage chance-constrained day-ahead market clearing problem takes uncertain wind in-feed into account, resulting in optimal day-ahead dispatch schedule and an affine participation policy for generators for the real-time reserve provision. Under certain assumptions, the chance-constrained market clearing is reformulated as a quadratic program. Using tools from equilibrium modeling and variational inequalities, we explore the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Under the assumption of perfect competition in the market, we evaluate the satisfaction of desirable market properties, namely cost recovery, revenue adequacy, market efficiency, and incentive compatibility. To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed market clearing, it is benchmarked against a deterministic cooptimization of energy and reserve procurement. Biased and unbiased out-of-sample simulation results for a power systems test case highlight that the proposed market clearing results in lower expected system operations cost than the deterministic benchmark, without the loss of any desirable market properties.
Info
Conference Paper, 2020
UN SDG Classification
DK Main Research Area
Science/Technology
